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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
The

state appeals

Cox’s motion

from the

district court’s

The

to suppress evidence.

employee was acting as a

that a hotel

room to show an ofﬁcer the

order partially granting Lonnie Eugene

state challenges the district court’s determination

state’s

agent

When she opened the door t0 Cox’s hotel

syringe loaded With heroin that hotel employees had discovered

earlier.

Statement

Of The

Facts

And Course Of The Proceedings

Police applied for a warrant to search a hotel

The evidence submitted

7-9.)

in support

room

for evidence of heroin. (R., pp.

of the warrant application included that a hotel

housekeeping employee entered a room, saw a syringe on the ﬂoor, and called police.

When

p. 10.)

the door.

heroin.

an ofﬁcer responded the employee took the ofﬁcer t0 the room and opened

(R., p. 10.)

The syringe contained a brown

The ofﬁcer seized

(R., p. 10.)

seeking a search warrant.

occupant of the room.

The

state

(R., p. 10.)

(R., p. 10.)

charged

The

room
140.)

and

district court

to clean,

(R., pp. 62-63.)

it

initial

was

room While

employee identiﬁed Lonnie COX as the
for heroin. (R., p. 10.)

possession 0f methamphetamine,

COX moved

t0 suppress evidence,

warrantless search 0f his room.

(R., pp.

found that a hotel housekeeping employee entered Cox’s hotel

“saw a syringe laying 0n the ﬂoor and immediately

The employee

that

hotel

The syringe ﬁeld tested positive

arguing that the ofﬁcer had conducted an

The

liquid the ofﬁcer suspected

the syringe and police secured the

Cox with possession of heroin,

and possession 0f paraphernalia.

69-71.)

(R.,

told her supervisor,

contained a colored liquid.

Who

then went into the

(R., p. 140.)

The

left

the room.” (R., p.

room and saw the

syringe

hotel supervisor recognized the

syringe as drug paraphernalia that likely contained heroin and called the police.

140-41.)

When

(R., pp.

an ofﬁcer responded the supervisor “took him” t0 the room and “opened

the door While [the ofﬁcer] stood in front of it.” (R., p. 141 .)

It

was “undisputed

that [the

ofﬁcer] did not expressly ask 0r direct [the hotel supervisor] to open the door.”

(R., p.

141 .)
the hotel supervisor opened Cox’s hotel

Once

room

door, the ofﬁcer could see the

syringe from the hallway and “immediately recognized the syringe as ‘loaded’ with a

brownish ﬂuid he recognized as probably heroin.”

room and secured the
ofﬁcer to secure the

(R., p. 141.)

syringe for safety reasons.1 (R., p. 141.)

room while he

The ofﬁcer entered

He then

applied for a search warrant.

contacted another

(R., p. 141.)

ultimately found heroin, methamphetamine, and paraphernalia in the hotel

on Cox’s person?

The

room by

Cox’s Fourth Amendment

rights

district court

1

(R., pp. 144-56.)

hotel employees

The

district court

were not governmental

actions,

were not implicated by those entrances.

room t0 show the ofﬁcer What

Because the hotel employee was acting as a

state agent,

room

concluded that the

and therefore

(R., pp.

determined the hotel employee was an agent of the

she opened the door 0f the hotel

52.)

room and heroin

granted suppression of the evidence found in Cox’s

pursuant to the search warrant.

However, the

Ofﬁcers

(R., p. 143.)

district court

entrances into the

the

150-5 1 .)

state

When

she had seen. (R., pp. 151-

according to the

district court,

conceded below that the entry into the hotel room by the ofﬁcer before obtaining
the warrant was improper. (TL, p. 9, L. 24 — p. 11, L. 8.)
2
The district court denied suppression 0f the heroin 0n Cox’s person because it was found
incident t0 his arrest 0n a valid arrest warrant. (R., pp. 157-58.)

The

state

2

the ofﬁcer did not see the syringe in plain

View but instead saw the syringe

as the result of

the employee’s governmental search. (R., pp. 152-53.)

The

state

ﬁled a timely notice 0f appeal from the order granting suppression 0f the

evidence found in the hotel

room by execution of the

search warrant. (R., pp. 161-63.)

ISSUE
Did the district court erroneously conclude that the hotel employee’s act of opening
Cox’s hotel room door constituted a governmental search implicating the Fourth

Amendment?

ARGUMENT
The

Cox’s Hotel
A.

Concluded That The Hotel Employee’s Act Of Opening
Room Door Constituted A Governmental Search

District Court Erroneouslv

Introduction

The

district court

reasoned that the hotel employee’s and ofﬁcer’s joint purpose 0f

showing the ofﬁcer the syringe

that the

employee had previously seen

in the hotel

room

converted the hotel employee into a state agent, and therefore her act of opening the door
constituted a governmental search. (R., pp. 144-56.) That the

to see the syringe she

had seen

employee had seen

the hotel

employee Wished the ofﬁcer

in

Cox’s room, and that the ofﬁcer wished to see the syringe

in

Cox’s room, did not convert the hotel employee into a

governmental agent.

B.

Standard

Of Review

In reviewing a district court’s order granting a motion to suppress the appellate

court “Will accept the

trial

court’s ﬁndings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous” but

Will “freely review the trial court’s application of constitutional principles in light 0f the

facts found.”

State V. Gonzales, 165 Idaho 667, 671,

450 P.3d 315, 319 (2019)

(internal

quotation marks omitted).

C.

The Hotel Employee Was Not A
Door

State

Agent When She Opened Cox’s Hotel Room

The Fourth Amendment “was intended as a restraint upon the
authority,

Burdeau

and was not intended

V.

to

activities

of sovereign

be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies.”

McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921). Thus, the Fourth Amendment has been

consistently

construed

“as

prescribing

only governmental action” and

is

“Wholly

inapplicable t0 a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected
individual.” United States V. Jacobsen,

E

omitted).

466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)

also State V. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516, 519,

private search “implicates

no

interests

by

a private

marks

(internal quotation

716 P.2d 1288, 1291 (1986)

0f the Fourth Amendment or

art. 1,

§ 17

(a

ofthe Idaho

Constitution because those provisions only prohibit illegal governmental searches and
seizures” (emphasis original».

“It is

ﬁrmly established

private search, even though wrongfully conducted,

amendment unless government

is

that evidence obtained through a

not excludable under the fourth

ofﬁcials instigated the search 0r otherwise participated in

a wrongful search.” State V. Kopsa, 126 Idaho 512, 517, 887 P.2d 57, 62 (Ct. App. 1994).

The applicable

test is

citizen, “in light

whether the private

of all the circumstances

0f the case, must be regarded as having acted as an ‘instrument’ 0r agent of the
Coolidge

V.

New Hampshire,

403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971)

analyzing whether the person conducting the search
the government,

we

is

(plurality opinion).

state.”

“Thus,

when

acting as an instrument or agent 0f

consider two critical factors—Whether the government

knew of and

acquiesced in the intrusive conduct and Whether the party performing the search intended
to assist

law enforcement

efforts 0r further his or her

841, 844, 379 P.3d 1111, 1114 (Ct. App. 2016).

own ends.”

“The burden of proving governmental

involvement in a search conducted by a private citizen
evidence.” Li. at 843, 379 P.3d at 1113.
either element ofhis claim that the hotel

or agent

When

As

she opened the hotel

to the ﬁrst

rests

on the party objecting

Review 0f the record shows Cox

failed to

to the

prove

employee was acting as a governmental instrument

room

prong of the

State V. Breese, 160 Idaho

test,

door.

more

is

required than ofﬁcer passivity.

The

“involvement of government ofﬁcials does not necessarily transform private conduct into

a government search or seizure.”

Wechsler

Wechsler, 162 Idaho 900, 913, 407 P.3d

V.

Rather, the “knowledge and

214, 227 (2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).

acquiescence” prong of the

must
V.

test

“encompass[es] the requirement that the government agent

also afﬁrmatively encourage, initiate or instigate the private action.”

Smﬂhe, 84 F.3d

1240, 1243 (10th Cir. 1996). “It

clear that if a

is

United States

government agent

is

involved ‘merely as a Witness,’ the requisite government action implicating Fourth

Amendment
48 (10th

concerns

Cir.

is

1996)).

absent.”

Li

(quoting United States V. Leffall, 82 F.3d 343, 347-

“While government agents

may

not circumvent the Fourth

Amendment by

acting through private citizens, they need not discourage private citizens

from doing

which

that

is

COX

In this case

not unlawful.” Li.
presented n0 evidence that the ofﬁcer was anything other than a

passive Witness. The district court found that

was “undisputed”

it

that the ofﬁcer “did not

expressly ask or direct” the hotel employee “t0 open the door.” (R., p. 141.) The ofﬁcer
testiﬁed he did not ask, suggest, 0r

command

the hotel

employee

(Prelim Tr., p. 11, Ls. 2-5; p. 44, Ls. 16-17; Tr., p. 58, L. 18

—

to

open the room door.

p. 59, L. 5.)

The

hotel

employee testiﬁed she called the police as required by policy, then took the responding
ofﬁcer to the room Where she opened the door.
11.)

She showed the ofﬁcer the loaded heroin syringe

unsafe situation.”
p. 23, L.

19

—

(Tr., p. 34, L. 8

— p.

p. 24, L. 4; p. 27, L. 13

15; p. 47, L. 15

who

(Tr., p. 32, L.

— p.

35, L. 5;

— p.

ﬂ alﬂ

in the

— p.

34, L. 7; p. 42, Ls. 2-

room because

it

was “an

p. 20, Ls. 8-23; p. 21, Ls. 14-20;

28, L. 9; p. 37, L.

48, L. 8.) Because the ofﬁcer

12

24 —p. 38,

L. 4; p. 43, Ls. 7-

was nothing other than a passive Witness

did not afﬁrmatively encourage, initiate 0r instigate the private action,

Cox

failed to

prove the ﬁrst element 0f his claim that the hotel employee was acting as an agent of the
state.

In concluding otherwise, the district court determined that the ﬁrst element of the

claim was proven because the ofﬁcer “follow[ed] [the hotel employee] to the room

knowing she Wished

to

show him

the syringe

View the inside of Cox’s room once
However,

as

[the hotel

shown above, merely going

and standing

hallway positioned t0

employee] opened the door.”

to the scene

(R., p. 151.)

of the private search t0 see the

evidence thus exposed does not meet the ﬁrst prong 0f the
citizen’s actions Within the

in the

test.

“In order t0 bring a private

purview of the Fourth Amendment, the government must be

involved either directly as a participant or indirectly as an encourager.” Breese, 160 Idaho
at 844,

379 P.3d

at

1114. There

either a direct participant to

open the door.
encourage,

mm, 84 F.3d
that

it

at

n0

factual ﬁnding,

and n0 evidence,

that the ofﬁcer

was

opening the door 0r that he encouraged the hotel employee to

This prong

initiate

is

is

unproved because the ofﬁcer did not “afﬁrmatively

or instigate the private action” and

was “involved merely

1243 (internal quotation marks omitted). The

as a Witness.”

district court’s

conclusion

mere foreknowledge 0fthe impending private search combined with traveling to where

would take place confers

party

is

the imprimatur of agency

on the non-governmental searching

legally erroneous.

The second element Cox had

to

prove was that “the party performing the search

intended to assist law enforcement efforts” rather than “further his 0r her

m,

160 Idaho

at

844, 379 P.3d at 1114.

employee considered herself
capacity as a hotel employee,

to

Here there was n0 evidence

own

ends.”

that the hotel

be acting on behalf of the police, as opposed t0 in her

When

she opened the door.

T0

the contrary, the evidence

conclusively establishes that the hotel employee called the police and showed the

responding ofﬁcer the syringe because she considered having a loaded heroin syringe on
the

ﬂoor of a room Where her

L. 5;

ﬂ

alﬂp.

—

own

—p. 24,

—

p. 38, L. 4; p. 43, Ls. 7-15; p. 47, L. 15

ends.”

record suggests the employee

be a

be a safety hazard. (TL,

20, Ls. 8-23; p. 21, Ls. 14-20; p. 23, L. 19

28, L. 9; p. 37, L. 24

“further[ing] her

staff worked t0

m,

160 Idaho

who opened the

at 844,

379 P.3d

L. 4; p. 27, L. 13

35,

—p.

She was

p. 48, L. 8.)

Nothing in the

at 1114.

way to

hotel door considered herself in any

state agent.

In concluding otherwise the district court found that although the

went

— p.

p. 34, L. 8

to the

room and looked

in

it

for safety reasons, her only

enforcement was able to engage Cox directly.”
erroneous.

As noted

(R., p. 152.)

staff not to enter the

152.)

(R., p.

initially

motive in opening the door

With the ofﬁcer present was “t0 assist law enforcement efforts.”

been so motivated, she would have “instructed her

employee

Had

room

This ﬁnding

she not

until

is

law

clearly

above, the only evidence presented at the hearing was that the hotel

employee showed the ofﬁcer the syringe because she was concerned about her own safety
and the safety ofher
p. 27, L. 13

—p. 28,

p. 47, L. 15

—

staff.

(Tr., p. 20, Ls. 8-23; p. 21, Ls.

L. 9; p. 34, L. 8

p. 48, L. 8.)

It

—p. 35,

was

L. 5; p. 37, L.

merely keeping hotel

staff out

24 —p. 38,

— p.

24, L. 4;

L. 4; p. 43, Ls. 7-15;

entirely reasonable t0 address the safety concern

showing the police the syringe she had just seen so
hazard from the hotel. Although the

14-20; p. 23, L. 19

district judge

that they

would remove the

would have handled

by

safety

the safety issue

by

of the room, that does not mean the hotel employee

considered herself an agent 0f law enforcement.

There

is

no evidence

that the hotel

employee considered herself t0 be acting with law enforcement purpose rather than Within

her duties as a hotel staff manager trying t0 keep her cleaning staff safe.

Therefore

Cox

did not meet his burden of proof as t0 this second element of his claim and the district
court’s conclusion he did

is

clearly erroneous.

In order to prove government action where, as here, the search

private party, the defendant

relationship

opposed

as

by

its

must prove two

things: that the

actions and the private person

to private, purpose.

The

facts

was

trying t0 achieve a

law enforcement,

to create

an agency relationship and

employee did not consider herself an agent of the government When she opened

the door and exposed the interior of Cox’s room.

the opening 0f the door

D.

government created an agency

of this case show the exact opposite ofwhat Cox

had the burden 0f proving. The ofﬁcer did nothing
the hotel

was conducted by a

The

was a government

The

district court erred in

ﬁnding

that

search.

District Court’s Error Requires Reversal

A search warrant is
the underlying application

still

valid despite the inclusion of illegally obtained evidence in

if,

“after the tainted evidence is excluded,” the application

“contains adequate facts from Which the magistrate could have concluded that probable

cause existed for the issuance 0f the search warrant.” State

V.

Revenaugh, 133 Idaho 774,

779, 992 P.2d 769, 774 (1999).3 Here, the state below conceded that the ofﬁcer improperly
entered the hotel room, and therefore evidence of his seizure 0f the syringe and the ﬁeld

testing that

it

contained heroin should be stricken from the warrant application, but that

probable cause was established by the remaining evidence in the application. (TL,

3

The

state

does not challenge the

observations from outside the hotel

district court’s

room

are excised

determination that if the ofﬁcer’s

from the warrant application

not establish probable cause for issuance of the search warrant.
10

p. 9, L.

it

does

24 —

p. 11, L. 8.)

Absent evidence obtained by seizure 0f the syringe, the application

forth that the ofﬁcer

saw from outside

the hotel

room

sets

a syringe loaded With What he

believed in his training and experience was heroin. (R., p. 10.) Seeing the syringe, Which
the ofﬁcer believed contained heroin, established probable cause for issuance of the search

warrant. State V. Josephson, 123 Idaho 790, 794, 852 P.2d 1387, 1391 (1993) (“It

is

well-

established law that in order t0 support a ﬁnding of probable cause an afﬁdavit

must

provide facts sufﬁcient to create probable cause for belief that the forbidden articles are
Within the place t0 be searched at the time the search warrant

is

requested.” (internal

quotation marks omitted». Therefore, the district court erroneously suppressed evidence

found pursuant

to the search warrant.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectﬁllly requests this

suppressing evidence found in Cox’s hotel

Court t0 reverse the

room

district court’s

as a result 0f execution 0f the search

warrant.

DATED this 9th day 0f June, 2020.
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